The short answer
Kerberoasting is an Active Directory attack where any domain user asks a domain controller for a Kerberos service ticket, takes it offline and cracks the service account's password from it. It needs no admin rights and sends nothing to the target service. MITRE ATT&CK tracks it as T1558.003, under Credential Access.
It works because part of every service ticket is encrypted with a key made from the service account's password. A weak password, or the old RC4 cipher, makes that key easy to guess. Microsoft's 2026 updates changed the RC4 default, but weak service account passwords still crack, and defenders can spot the attack in event 4769 on their domain controllers.
This guide is for OSCP® students practicing Active Directory and for defenders who want to know what to log and fix.
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Our video "Active Directory AS-REP Roasting & Kerberoasting" starts with username enumeration, covers AS-REP roasting at 1:57 and Kerberoasting (plus a fix for clock errors) at 5:15, then moves to credential testing at 10:45 and getting a shell at 13:15. It runs 17 minutes 57 seconds.
What is Kerberos? KDC, TGT, service tickets and SPNs in plain English
Kerberos is the authentication protocol Windows domains use to prove who you are. Microsoft describes three parties: the client, the service it wants to reach, and the Key Distribution Center (KDC) that both trust. The KDC runs on every domain controller. The flow has two steps:
- You sign in and get a ticket-granting ticket (TGT). It proves you already logged in, so your password isn't sent again.
- You trade the TGT for a service ticket. To open a file share or a SQL Server database, your machine shows the TGT to the KDC's ticket-granting service (TGS) and asks for a ticket for that one service. The service checks the ticket without calling the domain controller.
The KDC knows which account runs a service by its service principal name (SPN). In MITRE's words, "Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service." The classic example is a SQL Server instance with an MSSQLSvc SPN, running under a domain user account.
The name comes from the three-headed watch dog of Greek myth, Cerberus in Latin. Three heads, three parties.
How a Kerberoasting attack works
Tim Medin presented the technique and released his Kerberoast tools at DerbyCon 2014. At concept level, it runs in four stages:
- Find accounts with SPNs. Any domain user can query the directory for accounts that have an SPN set. Computer accounts have long random passwords, so attackers look for user accounts. Impacket's notes point out that normal account passwords "tend to be shorter than machine accounts". BloodHound marks these as Kerberoastable accounts.
- Request service tickets. The attacker requests a ticket for each of those SPNs. This is ordinary Kerberos traffic: "Users with AD credentials can request tickets to any service account in AD," as Microsoft puts it.
- Take the ticket offline. Part of the service ticket is encrypted with the service account's key, which is derived from its password. The attacker saves that encrypted part as a hash.
- Guess passwords on their own machine. This is offline password cracking: a tool like hashcat or John the Ripper derives a key from each guess and tests it. It's a brute force attack the domain never sees, so there's no account lockout.
Two details trip people up. The ticket that gets cracked is a service ticket, and it's encrypted with the service account's key. Your own TGT only plays a supporting role: it's what lets you ask for the service ticket in the first place. Sean Metcalf summed up why defenders struggle: "No elevated rights are required to get the service tickets and no traffic is sent to the target."
Tools such as Impacket's GetUserSPNs, Rubeus and NetExec find SPN accounts and request the tickets. MITRE notes that "Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts." Service account credentials often carry more rights than they need, so one cracked password can go a long way.
Why RC4 and weak passwords make Kerberoasting work
The cipher on the ticket decides how fast each guess runs.
RC4-HMAC uses the account's NT hash as its key. RFC 4757 says so directly: "The key used for RC4-HMAC is the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash)." That key is one fast MD4 hash of the password with no salt, so a cracking rig can test a huge number of guesses per second.
AES keys come from a slow function. RFC 3962 sets a default of 4,096 iterations with a salt built from the account's name, so every guess costs thousands of hash rounds. The Rubeus docs put it plainly: AES hashes are much harder to crack than RC4 hashes.
Harder still means possible. Microsoft's guidance says "AES alone is not a solution for brute forcing and needs to be used in combination with strong passwords." A service account with a short or common password falls to a wordlist on either cipher.
This table links what defenders see in the event log to what a cracker sees:
| Ticket Encryption Type (event 4769) | Kerberos etype | Cipher | hashcat mode | Hash starts with |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0x17 | 23 | RC4-HMAC | 13100 | $krb5tgs$23$ |
| 0x11 | 17 | AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | 19600 | $krb5tgs$17$ |
| 0x12 | 18 | AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | 19700 | $krb5tgs$18$ |
Etype 23 is decimal for hex 0x17, which is why "krb5tgs 23" and "hashcat 13100" both point at RC4 service tickets.
Is Kerberoasting still a thing in 2026?
Yes, though the easy version is shrinking. Microsoft has spent four years pulling RC4 out of the default path:
- November 8, 2022. Updates for CVE-2022-37966 made AES-SHA1 the default for accounts with no encryption type set.
- January 14, 2025. A cumulative update gave event 4769 new fields on Windows Server 2016 and later, including MSDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes, Available Keys and Session Encryption Type.
- Windows Server 2025. Microsoft says its domain controllers "don't issue RC4 Ticket Granting Tickets."
- January 13, 2026. KB5073381 (CVE-2026-20833) started an audit phase, with new KDCSVC events 201 to 209 in the System log.
- April 14, 2026. Enforcement began. Accounts with no explicit setting now default to AES-SHA1 only (0x18).
- July 2026. Updates removed the RC4DefaultDisablementPhase registry value that allowed a rollback.
So a patched domain no longer hands out RC4 service tickets by default. Microsoft also says it "will honor any configuration explicitly set by an administrator", which leaves four openings: accounts an admin set to allow RC4, older accounts that still lack AES keys, domains that never got the updates, and AES tickets for accounts with weak passwords.
How to detect Kerberoasting
Requesting a service ticket is normal, so Kerberoasting detection means spotting patterns.
Turn on the audit policy. Enable "Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" for your domain controllers. Event 4769, "A Kerberos service ticket was requested," is generated only on domain controllers, so that's where you collect it.
Know the fields.
| 4769 field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Account Name | The user who asked for the ticket |
| Service Name | The account whose key encrypted the ticket |
| Client Address | The machine the request came from |
| Ticket Encryption Type | 0x17 means RC4; 0x11 and 0x12 mean AES |
| Failure Code | 0x0 for success; failures carry an error code |
Flag weak encryption. Microsoft's event guide says that starting with Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, you should "monitor for a Ticket Encryption Type other than 0x11 and 0x12." A 0x17 ticket in a modern domain deserves a look. MITRE's detection strategy DET0157 says the same: "RC4 (etype 0x17) usage in modern environments is suspicious."
Watch the volume. DET0157 also looks for "accounts requesting an unusual number of service tickets in a short period" and for service accounts "targeted outside normal usage baselines." Its tunables are a request threshold, a time window, allowed encryption types and per-account baselines.
Cut the noise. Tickets where the Service Name is krbtgt or a computer account ending in $ are mostly routine traffic, so many teams filter them out first.
Set a trap. A honeypot account is a user with an SPN that no service uses. Nobody has a reason to request its ticket, so any 4769 for it is worth an alert.
Use what you already have. Microsoft Defender for Identity raises an alert with external ID 2410 for suspected Kerberos SPN exposure. The KDCSVC events 201 to 209 show where RC4 is still in use, and the new 4769 fields explain why a ticket got the cipher it did.
Respond to an alert. Reset the targeted service account's password to a long random one, or move the service to a gMSA, then check what the requesting account touched.
How to prevent Kerberoasting
Work through these mitigations in order. The first two remove the target; the rest make it too slow to crack.
- Move services to managed accounts. With group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs), "the Windows operating system manages the password for the account instead of relying on the administrator to manage the password." Microsoft says gMSA passwords "are 120 characters long, complex, and randomly generated." Delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSAs) are the newer option. Either way, Microsoft says to "always configure AES for MSAs."
- Remove SPNs that nobody needs. List every user account with an SPN. Old test services and retired apps often leave one behind.
- Use long random passwords where a managed account won't work. Microsoft's floor is "at least a 14-character minimum password." MITRE suggests "ideally 25+ characters" for service accounts, since offline guessing has no time limit.
- Allow AES only. Set msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes to 0x18 (AES128 and AES256) on service accounts, or use the Group Policy setting "Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos". Microsoft's free scripts, List-AccountKeys.ps1 and Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1, show which accounts lack AES keys and which ciphers your tickets use.
- Apply least privilege. MITRE's advice is to "Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges." A service account in Domain Admins turns one cracked password into a domain takeover.
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) won't stop this attack. The attacker never signs in as the service account to get the ticket, and the cracking happens on their own hardware.
Kerberoasting vs AS-REP roasting and other Kerberos attacks
Kerberoasting has a close cousin. Both crack a password offline, but they start from different places.
| Detail | Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting |
|---|---|---|
| What the attacker needs | Any domain account | A username whose account has preauthentication turned off |
| What gets cracked | A service ticket (TGS-REP) | Part of the AS-REP reply to a TGT request |
| Whose password | The service account's | The target user's |
| Event on the DC | 4769 | 4768 |
| hashcat mode (RC4) | 13100 | 18200 |
| Main fix | Managed accounts, long passwords, AES | Turn preauthentication back on |
Our guide to AS-REP roasting and how it differs from Kerberoasting covers that attack in full.
Three more Kerberos attacks come up beside these. A silver ticket is a forged service ticket made with a service account's key, so a cracked Kerberoast password can lead straight to one. A golden ticket is a forged TGT made with the krbtgt account's key. Pass the ticket reuses a stolen ticket without knowing any password. MITRE groups the first two with Kerberoasting under T1558, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets.
Kerberoasting on the OSCP
OffSec's PEN-200 syllabus has a module called "Attacking Active Directory Authentication" that covers how to "Exploit weaknesses in Active Directory authentication mechanisms (Kerberos, NTLM, etc)". The syllabus doesn't list Kerberoasting by name, but it's a standard AD technique in OSCP-style practice. You should spot a Kerberoastable account the moment your enumeration shows one.
Explaining Kerberoasting and its fixes also comes up in job interviews, as our post on whether the OSCP is worth it points out. For where it fits in a full domain compromise, read our OSCP Active Directory methodology. Our free 2-hour video course for OSCP prep covers it inside a full AD methodology.
To see it worked on screen, our Hacking Active Directory playlist has AD methodology from the basics to full guides, with BloodHound, AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, certificate attacks and lateral movement. Our free Hacking Active Directory Course for Beginners reaches "Kerberoasting and Cracking" at 15:05.
FAQ
Is Kerberoasting still a thing?
Yes. Since Microsoft's April 2026 enforcement update, patched domain controllers no longer issue RC4 service tickets by default to accounts with no explicit setting. AES tickets still crack when the password is weak, and accounts set to allow RC4, accounts without AES keys and unpatched domains stay exposed. The attack lasts as long as weak service account passwords do.
Can you prevent Kerberoasting?
Yes. Run services under group Managed Service Accounts, whose 120-character random passwords Windows manages for you. Remove SPNs from user accounts that don't need them. Where a managed account won't work, use a long random password of 25 or more characters, allow only AES encryption, and keep service accounts out of privileged groups. MFA doesn't help, because the crack happens offline.
How do you detect Kerberoasting?
Enable "Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" on domain controllers and collect event 4769. Alert on a Ticket Encryption Type of 0x17 (RC4), on one account asking for many service tickets in a short window, and on any ticket request for a honeypot account. Filter out krbtgt and computer accounts first. Microsoft Defender for Identity also has a built-in alert, external ID 2410.
What is a Kerberos ticket?
A Kerberos ticket is an encrypted record the Key Distribution Center hands out so you can prove your identity without sending your password again. The ticket-granting ticket proves you signed in. A service ticket lets you use one specific service, such as a file share or database, and part of it is encrypted with that service account's key.
Why is it called Kerberos?
Kerberos is the Greek name of the three-headed dog that guards the underworld, spelled Cerberus in Latin. MIT's 1988 design dialogue picks the name for exactly that watch dog. It suits a protocol with three parties: the client, the service and the Key Distribution Center.
Is Kerberos still safe?
Kerberos is still Windows' main domain authentication protocol, and with AES and strong passwords it holds up well. The weak spots are settings: RC4 left enabled, service accounts with human-chosen passwords, accounts without preauthentication, and too many privileges. Microsoft's 2026 updates took RC4 out of the default. Fix those settings and Kerberoasting has little left to crack.
What are common attacks against Kerberos?
Kerberoasting and AS-REP roasting crack passwords offline from Kerberos replies. Silver tickets forge service tickets with a service account's key, golden tickets forge TGTs with the krbtgt key, and pass the ticket reuses a stolen ticket. Our AS-REP roasting guide compares the two roasting attacks side by side, including which event and hashcat mode each one uses.
Is Kerberos the same as LDAP?
No. Kerberos handles authentication: proving who you are and handing out tickets. LDAP is the protocol for querying and changing the directory, such as looking up users, groups and SPNs. They work together in Active Directory. In Kerberoasting, the attacker uses LDAP to find accounts with SPNs, then Kerberos to request their service tickets.
Practice Kerberoasting on a lab you're allowed to attack
Only roast tickets in a domain you own or have written permission to test, and keep the lab on an isolated network. The simplest setup is your own domain: build your own AD home lab with free evaluation copies of Windows Server, add a service account with an SPN and a weak password, then watch the 4769 events on your own domain controller as you test.
For more AD practice, our free Chain_01 and Chain_03 are three-machine Active Directory labs (two Windows clients and a domain controller) that you import into VirtualBox and attack offline, built like the OSCP-style AD set. You'll need 8 GB of RAM at minimum, 16 GB recommended, on an Intel or AMD machine. Get them from our free Active Directory labs, or see our roundup of free OSCP labs.
One of our students, Dharsun R J, wrote: "The content is clear, practical, and focuses on real attack scenarios, which makes learning a lot more engaging." (More reviews)
Try our 30+ hour course for OSCP prep with a free trial, or start with one of our free Active Directory chains.
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Sources
- MITRE ATT&CK: Kerberoasting, T1558.003 (definition, SPN quote, impact of cracked hashes, mitigations M1041, M1027 and M1026; modified Nov 4, 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, T1558 (silver ticket, golden ticket and AS-REP roasting as sibling techniques)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Detection strategy DET0157 (4769 with etype 0x17, request volume, baselines, tunables; checked Nov 10, 2026)
- Microsoft Learn: Event 4769 (domain controllers only, audit subcategory, ticket encryption types, the 0x11 and 0x12 monitoring rule, fields added by the January 2025 update; updated Apr 27, 2026)
- Microsoft Learn: Detect and remediate RC4 usage in Kerberos (RC4 and Kerberoasting, the November 2022 default change, Windows Server 2025 TGTs, msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes values, audit scripts, Group Policy name; updated Feb 6, 2026)
- Microsoft Support: KB5073381, CVE-2026-20833 (January, April and July 2026 phases, KDCSVC events 201 to 209, explicit settings honored; last changed Apr 14, 2026)
- Microsoft Learn: Kerberos authentication overview (three parties, KDC on every domain controller, TGT and service ticket flow; updated Sep 14, 2026)
- Microsoft Security blog: Microsoft's guidance to help mitigate Kerberoasting (any user can request tickets, AES alone isn't enough, gMSA password length, 14-character minimum, Defender for Identity alert 2410; Oct 11, 2024)
- Microsoft Windows Server blog: Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication (RC4 and Kerberoasting, the mid-2026 default change; Dec 3, 2025)
- Microsoft Learn: Group Managed Service Accounts overview (Windows manages the password, Windows Server 2012 requirement, AES for MSAs; updated Feb 16, 2026)
- Microsoft on GitHub: Kerberos-Crypto (List-AccountKeys.ps1 and Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1)
- RFC 4757: The RC4-HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types (RC4 key equals the NT hash; Dec 2006)
- RFC 3962: AES Encryption for Kerberos 5 (4,096 iterations and a salt from the principal name; Feb 2005)
- hashcat: Example hashes (modes 13100, 19600, 19700 and 18200 and their hash prefixes; checked Nov 10, 2026)
- Rubeus docs: kerberoast (what the tool does, AES hashes harder to crack than RC4)
- Impacket: GetUserSPNs.py (what the tool does, credit to Tim Medin, user account passwords shorter than machine accounts)
- NetExec wiki: Kerberoasting (what the tool does)
- ADSecurity: Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast (Tim Medin and DerbyCon 2014, no elevated rights and no traffic to the target; Dec 31, 2015)
- MIT: Designing an Authentication System, a Dialogue in Four Scenes (the name from the three-headed watch dog; Bill Bryant, 1988)
- Picus Security: What Is a Kerberoasting Attack? (honeypot SPN accounts; updated Nov 25, 2024)
- OffSec: PEN-200 syllabus (Attacking Active Directory Authentication module; March 2026)
- Hacker Blueprint: Active Directory AS-REP Roasting & Kerberoasting (YouTube, Aug 14, 2025)
- Hacker Blueprint: Hacking Active Directory Course for Beginners (YouTube, Jul 22, 2025)


