AS-REP Roasting Explained: How It Works, Detection and Prevention

    AS-REP roasting turns one ticked Kerberos box into an offline password crack. Here's how the attack works, what your domain controllers log, how to shut it down, and how it compares to Kerberoasting.

    By Hacker Blueprint··12 min read

    The short answer

    AS-REP roasting is an Active Directory attack on user accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication turned off. Anyone who knows such a username can ask the domain controller for a login reply, and part of that reply is encrypted with a key made from the user's password. The attacker takes it offline and guesses passwords until one fits.

    The fix is one checkbox: turn pre-authentication back on, and give any account that has to keep it off a long, random password. Defenders can spot the attack in event 4768 on their domain controllers. This guide is for OSCP® students practicing Active Directory (AD) and for defenders who want to know what to log and fix.

    We're Hacker Blueprint. Our instructor holds the OSCP, our academy has more than 600 students, and around 7,000 people have claimed our prep materials.

    Our video "Active Directory Attacks for OSCP Exam (AS-REP Roasting)" walks through the attack in a lab: setup at 0:00, troubleshooting and running it at 1:16, reading the captured hashes at 2:25 and where it fits in an AD methodology at 2:58. It runs just over 5 minutes.

    How Kerberos pre-authentication works

    Kerberos is the login protocol Windows domains use. The Key Distribution Center (KDC), which runs on every domain controller, hands out tickets. The first one a user gets is the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), and asking for it takes two messages:

    1. AS-REQ. The client asks the KDC's Authentication Service for a TGT.
    2. AS-REP. The KDC sends back the TGT, encrypted with the key of the domain's krbtgt account, plus a second part encrypted with the user's own key. That key is derived from the user's password.

    Pre-authentication adds a check before step 2. The client must include the current time, encrypted with the user's key (a field called PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP). Only a client that already knows the password gets an AS-REP back. MITRE ATT&CK puts it simply: "Preauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking." And "Kerberos preauthentication is enabled by default."

    What AS-REP roasting exposes when pre-authentication is off

    Windows stores the setting as a flag in each account's userAccountControl attribute: DONT_REQ_PREAUTH, hex 0x400000, decimal 4194304. In Active Directory Users and Computers it's the "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" box on the Account tab.

    With that flag set, the KDC skips the timestamp check for that account. Anyone on the network can send an AS-REQ in that user's name and get an AS-REP back, including the part encrypted with the user's key. The attacker tests password guesses against it on their own machine. The domain never sees those guesses, so lockout policies don't help.

    Will Schroeder of SpecterOps described the technique in his January 2017 post "Roasting AS-REPs", building on a presentation by Geoff Janjua, and released a PowerShell toolkit with it called ASREPRoast. That's where the one-word spelling comes from, and why you'll also see it written ASREP roasting or asreproasting. MITRE tracks the technique as T1558.004.

    With a list of valid usernames, no password is needed at all. And any low-privilege domain login can ask the directory which accounts have the flag.

    Why accounts end up with pre-authentication disabled

    • Unix and MIT Kerberos compatibility. Microsoft's documentation for event 4768 says the pre-authentication error "often occurs in UNIX interoperability scenarios," because "MIT-Kerberos clients do not request pre-authentication." Turning the check off for one account is the quick workaround.
    • Old fixes nobody reverted. Someone changes an account to get an older application or a test working, and the flag stays set for years.
    • Attackers who set it themselves. Schroeder's post describes how, with GenericWrite or GenericAll rights over a user, an attacker can tick the box, roast the account, then untick it, a move often called targeted AS-REP roasting. That leaves log events, covered under detection below.

    AS-REP roasting vs Kerberoasting

    Both attacks pull password-derived material out of Kerberos and crack it offline. They differ in who they target and what you need to start. Our Kerberoasting attack guide covers the other half in the same depth.

    Point AS-REP roasting Kerberoasting
    Credentials needed None if you know usernames Any domain user
    Target accounts Users with pre-authentication disabled Accounts with a service principal name (SPN)
    Message cracked AS-REP, from the login exchange TGS-REP, a service ticket
    Domain controller event 4768, Pre-Auth Type 0 4769
    hashcat mode, RC4 18200 13100
    hashcat modes, AES 32100 and 32200 19600 and 19700
    MITRE ATT&CK T1558.004 T1558.003
    Main fix Turn pre-authentication back on Long random service account passwords, AES only

    Kerberoasting usually finds more targets, since service accounts with SPNs are everywhere. AS-REP roasting is rarer, and it's the one that can work before you have any login at all. Another credential-access technique that needs no login is LLMNR poisoning, which captures hashes from the network itself.

    AS-REP roasting tools and hash formats

    The tools you'll see in writeups, and what each one does:

    • Impacket GetNPUsers. A Python script from the Impacket collection that finds accounts without pre-authentication and requests their AS-REPs in a format crackers accept.
    • Rubeus. A C# Kerberos toolkit with an asreproast command. MITRE notes that "Rubeus can reveal the credentials of accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication disabled through AS-REP roasting."
    • NetExec. Checks credentials across many hosts and has an AS-REP roasting option.
    • Kerbrute. Checks which usernames exist in a domain through Kerberos, which gives an attacker the username list AS-REP roasting needs without a login.
    • BloodHound. Maps AD relationships, including users that don't require pre-authentication and who holds GenericWrite over whom.
    • hashcat and John the Ripper. The crackers. John calls the format krb5asrep.

    The encryption type in the reply decides the hashcat mode. hashcat names each mode after the reply it cracks, such as "Kerberos 5, etype 23, AS-REP" for mode 18200:

    Encryption type Kerberos etype hashcat mode Added in hashcat
    RC4-HMAC 23 (0x17) 18200, hashes start with $krb5asrep$23$ 5.1.0
    AES128 17 (0x11) 32100 7.0.0
    AES256 18 (0x12) 32200 7.0.0

    Older articles say hashcat can't crack AES AS-REPs. That changed with hashcat 7.0.0 in August 2025.

    To see these attacks inside a full methodology, our Hacking Active Directory playlist covers AD methodology from the basics to full guides, with BloodHound, AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, certificate attacks and lateral movement. The free Hacking Active Directory Course for Beginners reaches AS-REP roasting at 2:30:58.

    Is AS-REP roasting still a thing in 2026?

    Yes. Microsoft is pushing RC4 out of Kerberos. Its support article for CVE-2026-20833 (KB5073381) says the April 14, 2026 update "changes the default value for DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to AES-SHA1 only: 0x18," and a July 2026 update removes the RC4DefaultDisablementPhase registry setting.

    That work targets service tickets, the Kerberoasting side, and the KB article never mentions AS-REP roasting. An AS-REP encrypted with AES still cracks offline with modes 32100 and 32200. It's much slower, because AES keys are built with thousands of hashing rounds (RFC 3962 sets a default of 4,096), so a long password moves out of reach. A short one stays crackable either way.

    MITRE updated T1558.004 on November 4, 2026, and added a detection strategy for it (DET0113) in October 2025.

    How to detect AS-REP roasting

    Event 4768, "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested," is logged only on domain controllers, under the Audit Kerberos Authentication Service subcategory. Fields to watch:

    • Pre-Authentication Type 0. Microsoft defines it as "Logon without Pre-Authentication" and calls accounts set up that way "a security risk." MITRE's DET0113 analytic starts with "Event ID 4768 with Pre-Auth Type 0."
    • Ticket Encryption Type 0x17. That's RC4-HMAC. Microsoft suggests monitoring for values "other than 0x11 and 0x12," the two AES types.
    • Volume and source. One host asking for many TGTs without pre-authentication in a short time looks like a roasting run. DET0113 also flags "Excessive enumeration of accounts with 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set."

    Then watch the flag itself. Event 4738 (a user account was changed) shows "'Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled" when someone ticks the box (Elastic has a detection rule for it). Event 5136 (a directory object was modified) records the userAccountControl change if directory service change auditing is on. A flag that flips on and back off within minutes points to the GenericWrite trick.

    Microsoft Defender for Identity (MDI) has a high-severity alert for this pattern: "Suspected AS-REP Roasting attack" (external ID 2412).

    How to prevent AS-REP roasting

    Start by finding every flagged account. Microsoft notes that "The flags are cumulative," so test whether bit 4194304 is set instead of comparing the whole userAccountControl value. In LDAP that's a bitwise AND filter:

    (&(objectCategory=person)(objectClass=user)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304))
    

    The Active Directory PowerShell module exposes the same flag as a property called DoesNotRequirePreAuth, and MDI lists these accounts under "Unsecure account attributes." Then:

    1. Turn pre-authentication back on. Untick "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication." MDI recommends exactly this, and MITRE's mitigation advice is to "make sure that all accounts have preauthentication whenever possible." For most accounts that's the whole job.
    2. Give exceptions a very long password. If a Unix integration truly needs the flag, use a random password. MITRE asks for "strong password length (ideally 25+ characters)" on service accounts, and the same logic applies.
    3. Prefer AES and reset old passwords. MITRE advises "AES Kerberos encryption... rather than RC4, where possible." Very old passwords may lack AES keys, so reset them on a modern domain controller.
    4. Lock down write rights on users. GenericWrite and GenericAll let an attacker set the flag on demand. Review who holds them and alert on 4738 and 5136 changes to the flag.

    FAQ

    What is AS-REP roasting?

    AS-REP roasting is an attack on Active Directory accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication disabled. The attacker requests a login reply (an AS-REP) for the account, and part of that reply is encrypted with a key derived from the user's password. They crack it offline. MITRE ATT&CK tracks it as T1558.004, and you'll also see it spelled ASREPRoast or asrep roasting.

    Do you need credentials for AS-REP roasting?

    No, if you already know a valid username that has pre-authentication disabled. The domain controller answers the request without any password. With a single domain login you can also ask the directory which accounts have the flag set, which is how most attackers find their targets. Without credentials, you need a username list.

    What hash type does AS-REP roasting use?

    It depends on the encryption type in the reply. RC4 replies (etype 23) use hashcat mode 18200, listed as "Kerberos 5, etype 23, AS-REP", and start with $krb5asrep$23$. AES128 (etype 17) uses mode 32100, and AES256 (etype 18) uses mode 32200, both added in hashcat 7.0.0. John the Ripper calls the format krb5asrep.

    What is the difference between AS-REP roasting and Kerberoasting?

    AS-REP roasting targets users with pre-authentication disabled and cracks the AS-REP from the login exchange, often without any credentials. Kerberoasting targets accounts with a service principal name and cracks a service ticket, which needs any domain login. AS-REP shows up as event 4768, Kerberoasting as 4769. Our Kerberoasting guide covers that attack in full.

    What event ID detects AS-REP roasting?

    Event 4768 on the domain controller, with Pre-Authentication Type 0. Look for Ticket Encryption Type 0x17 (RC4) and many requests from one source. Event 4738 shows when someone enables "Don't Require Preauth" on an account, and Defender for Identity raises alert 2412, "Suspected AS-REP Roasting attack."

    How do you find accounts with pre-authentication disabled?

    Search for user accounts whose userAccountControl has bit 4194304 (0x400000) set, using an LDAP bitwise filter, or check the DoesNotRequirePreAuth property in the Active Directory PowerShell module. Defender for Identity lists them under "Unsecure account attributes," and BloodHound marks them too. Check the bit itself, since the flags are cumulative.

    Does disabling RC4 stop AS-REP roasting?

    No. Microsoft's 2026 RC4 changes target service tickets, and an AES-encrypted AS-REP can still be cracked offline with hashcat modes 32100 and 32200. AES only slows cracking down. The fix is turning pre-authentication back on, plus a long random password on any account that has to keep it off.

    Is AS-REP roasting on the OSCP?

    OffSec doesn't publish a list of exam attacks. Its PEN-200 course page lists "attacking Active Directory authentication" in the syllabus without naming specific techniques. AS-REP roasting is a standard AD technique in OSCP-style practice, so learn it alongside Kerberoasting. Our OSCP Active Directory methodology shows where it fits.

    Practice AS-REP roasting on a lab you're allowed to attack

    Only run this attack on systems you own or have written permission to test, and keep any lab on an isolated network. The best way to see both sides is to build your own AD home lab: tick the pre-authentication box on one test user, roast it, then read what your domain controller logged in 4768.

    For a ready-made domain, our free Chain_01 and Chain_03 are three-machine AD labs (two Windows clients and a domain controller) that you import into VirtualBox and attack offline, built like the OSCP-style AD set. They need 8 GB of RAM at minimum, 16 GB recommended, and an Intel or AMD processor. Our Chain_03 BleedWide writeup and free OSCP labs guide explain the setup.

    One of our students, Bigmo, wrote: "I've gone through plenty of training material before as I pivot from Telecommunications to Offensive Security, nothing comes close to this in preparation for OSCP. AD Chains are a gem, worth every penny." (More reviews)

    Try our 30+ hour course for OSCP prep with a free trial, or start with one of our free Active Directory chains.

    Got an AS-REP hash that won't crack? Ask in the Hacker Blueprint Discord.

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